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ONLINE MUSIC JOINT VENTURES: TAKEN FOR A SONG
Harry First*
Abstract
In 2001 the five major record companies, controlling more than 80 
percent of prerecorded music sales in the United States, announced the formation 
of two joint ventures to distribute music over the Internet.  The Department of 
Justice opened an antitrust investigation into these ventures even before the 
ventures began their operations.  Two and one-half years later the Department 
announced that it had closed the investigation because its theoretical concerns 
ultimately were not supported by the evidence.   The Department s 
investigation, however, focused on the ventures  licensing practices rather than 
on their formation.
This article focuses on the formation of the online music joint ventures.  
The article begins with a description of the business and legal environment in 
which the joint ventures were formed and traces developments in both since the 
ventures  formation.  Included in this description is the effort by the industry to 
suppress widespread copyright infringement and the entry of a number of new 
companies into the online music market.  The article s antitrust analysis 
examines the predicted anticompetitive effects of the formation of the ventures 
and, drawing on the Supreme Court s decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. and the history of performing rights 
organizations, argues that the efficiency justifications for the online music joint 
ventures were quite modest.  The article concludes that the formation of the 
ventures was anticompetitive, without regard to the ventures  licensing 
practices, and that the appropriate remedy would have been either to unwind the  
two ventures or divest the record companies  ownership of them.  Although the 
online music industry did not develop as might have been predicted when the 
ventures were formed, we owe these positive developments to the inability of the 
music industry to control the widespread infringement of their copyrights.  Had 
the record industry s campaign been successful, the competitive structure in the 
online music market would likely have been quite different and the proposed 
antitrust remedies would have been necessary to bring competition to the market 
for online music.
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I.  Introduction
Perhaps no industry has been more fundamentally challenged by the 
growth of the Internet and its related technologies than the recorded music 
industry.  For most industries, the Internet mainly provides a new, albeit 
potentially far more efficient, channel of distribution.  For the recording industry, 
however, the Internet has challenged the basic product the industry makes and 
the way it does business.  The recording industry has mostly bundled 
prerecorded music into packages ( albums ); the Internet offers consumers the 
opportunity to unbundle music and choose only the songs they want to hear.  The 
recording industry has maintained tight control over which artists get to 
distribute their work to the public; the Internet offers the opportunity for artists 
to deliver music directly to consumers.  The recording industry has created the 
end-product on which songs are sold (music on CDs, tape, and vinyl records); 
computer software and hardware allows consumers to capture recorded music on 
the media of their choice.  The recording industry has owned the copyrights to 
the music they sell; computer software and Internet connections allow consumers 
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to obtain music for free, in seeming disregard for copyright protection and the 
economic interests of the copyright holders.
The initial response of the recording industry to some of the challenges 
posed by the Internet was the creation of two joint ventures, pressplay and 
MusicNet, to distribute music online.  Producer joint ventures to control Internet 
distribution are not unique to the recording industry (the airline, hotel, and 
motion picture industries have also started such ventures), but the recording 
industry joint ventures dealt with some particularly challenging issues of 
antitrust, copyright, and innovation policy.  When the online music joint ventures 
were announced, they appeared to offer more competition and significant 
efficiency benefits, creating new entrants with a new product in a new market.  
Given the concentrated nature of the prerecorded music industry, however, and 
the ability of the record companies to control the licensing of their music to 
online music distributors, it was also clear that the joint ventures deserved closer 
antitrust scrutiny.  Indeed, the Department of Justice and the European 
Commission opened investigations of the two ventures even before the ventures 
began their operations.
Two and one-half years later the Department of Justice announced that it 
had closed its investigation because its theoretical concerns ultimately were not 
supported by the evidence. 1  However appropriate this decision might be as a 
matter of enforcement policy, however, the Department s explanation focused 
only on the ventures  licensing practices and sheds little light on the appropriate 
analysis of the ventures  formation.
The thesis of this article is that the formation of these producer joint 
ventures was not justified by any efficiencies and that their formation was 
anticompetitive.  More broadly, this article argues that the brief history of this 
industry demonstrates the danger to competition posed when the producers of 
essential inputs in a concentrated market join together to control downstream 
distribution, a danger exacerbated in this industry, involving, as it does, the 
distribution of intellectual property products. 
The article begins with a description of the business and legal 
environment in which the joint ventures were formed and then traces how both 
have developed since the ventures  formation.  The article then provides an 
analysis of whether the formation of the two joint ventures violated Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.  The article concludes with some observations regarding 
record industry joint ventures in today s rapidly changing market for the 
distribution of online music.
II.  The Online Music Business
1Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Statement Regarding the Closing of its 
Investigation into The Major Record Labels  pressplay and MusicNet Joint Ventures at 4 (issued 
December 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2003/201946.htm.
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A.  Prerecorded Music Distribution
Sales of prerecorded music are substantial.  Over the decade 1993-2002, 
the value of prerecorded music sales in the United States ranged between $10 
billion and $14.5 billion annually.2  Sales generally increased each year during 
that period, until 2001.3  Although sales declined in 2001 and again in 2002, 
sales in 2002 were still higher than they were in every year from 1993 through 
1998 and the decline may be reversing.4  The cause of the sales decline, 
however, is the subject of some controversy.5
There are five major companies (often referred to as distributors ) that 
manufacture prerecorded music produced by labels  that they own.  These five 
companies accounted for approximately 83 percent of U.S. album sales in 2002 
(as they did in 2001).6  The five companies are Universal Music Group 
( UMG ), with 28.9% of sales in 2002,7 Warner-Elektra-Atlantic Corporation, 
with 15.9%,8 Sony Music Entertainment, with 15.7%,9 BMG Music, with 
2See The Recording Industry Ass n of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics, available at 
http://www.riaa.com/news/marketingdata/pdf/year_end_2002.pdf (total dollar value of all 
shipments, net of returns; includes CDs, cassettes, LPs, music videos, and DVD video and audio; 
bulk of revenue is in CD sales).  By comparison, in 2002 U.S. movie box office gross revenues 
were $9.5 billion and U.S. video game industry had $10.3 billion in retail sales.  See U.S. 
Entertainment Industry: 2002 MPA Market Statistics, an economic review by the Motion Picture 
Association, available at 
http://www.mpaa.org/useconomicreview/2002/2002_Economic_Review.pdf, and The NPD 
Group Reports Annual 2002 U.S. Video Game Sales Break Record, January 27, 2003, available 
at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_030128a.htm.
3There was a 2.5 percent drop in revenues between 1996 and 1997.  Id.
4See Ethan Smith, Music Industry Sounds Upbeat as Losses Slow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 
2004, at B1 (including sales by online services, 2003 sales only .8% less than 2002 sales; 
excluding online sales, sales in 2003 were 2.1% less than 2002).
5See, e.g., Declining Music Sales: It's Not All Digital Downloading, Says The NPD 
Group, June 5, 2003,  available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_030605.htm (based 
on consumer surveys, half of lost sales attributed to free file sharing; but 60 percent of music 
consumers with Internet access have not downloaded any music and sales to these consumers 
have also dropped; half of consumers aged 36 and over report that there is less music that they 
are interested in buying); Music Industry Sounds Upbeat, supra note 4 (strong sales in fourth 
quarter of 2003 included a number of hit albums, such as OutKast s Speakerboxxx/The Love 
Below  and Norah Jones Come Away With Me ).
6See Ed Christman, UMVD expands market-share dominance, BILLBOARD, January 18, 
2003 (based on SoundScan data).  The market share of the top five distributors was 83 percent in 
2001 as well, see Ed Christman, UMVD marks 3rd straight year as top U.S. music distributor: 
UMVD leads in total, current album share, BILLBOARD, Jan. 26, 2002. 
7UMG s labels include A&M, Def Jam, Geffen, Island, MCA, Motown, Polydor, 
Universal and Verve.
8Warner s labels include Warner Brothers Records Inc., Atlantic Recording 
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14.8%,10 and EMI Music Distribution, with 8.4%.11  Warner was traditionally the 
market leader until UMG s 1998 acquisition of Polygram, which had been the 
sixth major distributor; UMG has led the market every year since that 
acquisition.   At the time the joint ventures were announced, four of the five 
major distributors were owned by larger companies, each with substantial media 
and entertainment interests (respectively, Vivendi, AOL/Time-Warner, Sony, 
and Bertelsmann), but the industry s ownership structure has not been stable.  In 
2000 Warner and EMI had attempted to merge their music businesses, but 
abandoned the effort after antitrust opposition from the European Commission.12
 In November 2003 Bertelsmann and Sony announced a merger of their music 
companies and Warner announced the sale of its music business to a group of 
private investors (rejecting a higher offer from EMI and after failing to reach a 
merger agreement with BMG).13  Under the U.S. Department of Justice/Federal 
Trade Commission Merger Guidelines, the industry would have been viewed as 
moderately to highly concentrated when the joint ventures were announced.14
The five major distributors are vertically integrated through manufactur-
ing and wholesaling.  Through their labels  these companies contract with 
recording artists to record music.  The  labels oversee production of the 
recording and develop promotional plans; the distribution companies handle 
wholesale distribution and engage in various, often extensive, promotional 
efforts.  These promotional efforts include securing television appearances for 
the artists, radio play for the music, and the payment of (sometimes extensive) 
fees to retail outlets to promote the records.
Corporation, Rhino Entertainment Company and Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.
9Sony s labels include Columbia, Epic, WORK Group, C2, Nashville, Sony Classical, 
and Sony Wonder.
10BMG s labels include RCA, Arista, BMG Classics, Windham Hill and Bad Boy 
Entertainment.
11EMI s labels include Capitol, Capitol Nashville, Blue Note, Angel Records and EMI 
Latin.
12See Regulators Sink EMI-Time Warner Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2000.
13See Mark Lander, Bertelsmann and Sony to Join Music Units, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 
2003, at C1; Ethan Smith & Charles Goldsmith, Bronfman Group Wins Warner Music, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 25, 2003, at B4.
14If the independents  are considered as a single firm, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) is 1893; otherwise the HHI would be slightly over 1600.  The federal enforcement agency 
Guidelines consider a market with an HHI above 1800 as highly concentrated ; markets 
between 1000 and 1800 are considered moderately concentrated.   See United States 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES  1.5.  
If the Bertelsmann-Sony merger is completed without challenge, the HHI would increase by more 
than 400 points, making the market highly concentrated.
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Retail distribution is done through a variety of channels.  The three main 
channels are traditional  retailers that specialize in the sale of prerecorded 
music (such as Tower Records), general merchandise discount retailers that do 
not specialize (such as Wal-Mart), and electronics discounters (such as Best 
Buy).  Retail distribution is also done through record clubs, which distribute 
their records by mail order; some of the major distributors have ownership 
interests in these clubs (for example, Columbia House, the largest club, is jointly 
owned by Sony and Time-Warner).  Retailers generally sell all or most genres of 
prerecorded music and do not limit their sales to music sold by any one 
particular distributor or recorded on any particular label.
The growth and spread of the Internet has expanded retail distribution 
channels.  Internet distribution offers some obvious efficiencies in comparison 
with traditional brick and mortar  retail distribution (centralized inventorying, 
no retail stores, fewer personnel).  The first step in taking advantage of these 
efficiencies came when new retailers, such as Amazon and CDnow, began 
selling prerecorded music on the Internet; this led traditional music retailers 
(such as Tower) to start their own Internet sales sites.  These Internet sites, 
however, still sold the same product that is sold through physical stores, which 
then needed to be physically delivered to consumers by mail.
The Internet, however, provides the opportunity to distribute prerecorded 
music in a form that is substantially different from music sold in physical stores, 
or even through Internet retail sites.15  Prerecorded music in digital format can 
readily be transmitted via the Internet (and subsequently listened to, stored, and 
replayed) divorced from the physical medium in which it was originally 
embodied.  Freed from the need for distribution of the original physical medium, 
the original prerecorded package can also be untied and the music distributed in 
different combinations (most obviously, by single songs).  The channels for this 
type of prerecorded music distribution bear more resemblance to applications 
program software than they do to physical stores (these channels relying, for 
example, on critical software technologies for file compression and 
transmission).  These new distribution channels can be thought of as 
distribution platforms,  to distinguish them from physical stores and Internet 
sales sites.
B.  The Legal Environment
1.  Copyright protection
Prerecorded music is protected by copyright.  Copyright law provides 
protection to the underlying musical work  (the song) and to the sound 
15See generally Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital 
Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 429 (2002) (discussing changes caused by online 
distribution).
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recording  (the sound of the song).16  Different parties generally own different 
rights; music publishers and/or songwriters generally control the musical works 
while the record companies or the recording artists generally control the sound 
recording right.17
The owner of the copyright in the musical work has the right to control 
its public performance, distribution, and reproduction.18  Absent the copyright 
owner s permission, a song cannot be performed in public (for example, by 
broadcasting it over the radio).  Once the song is recorded, however, the 
reproduction and distribution rights are subject to a statutory compulsory license 
(the mechanical license ) which permits other performers to reproduce and 
distribute the song on payment of a prescribed fee.19
The owner of the copyright in the sound recording has only a reproduc-
tion and  distribution rights, but not a performance right.20  That is, the copyright 
holder can prevent others from reproducing and distributing the particular 
recording of a song, but cannot prevent others from publicly performing the 
recording (say, by broadcasting it over the radio).
Internet transmission of music in digital formats potentially involves both 
the public performance and the reproduction of the copyrighted works.  Congress 
has altered the general copyright statute, however, to take account of what it 
believed were the special problems raised by digital distribution.
For musical works, Congress in 1995 extended the compulsory 
mechanical license to include the digital distribution of musical works by 
digital phonorecord delivery  ( DPD ).21  Under this provision, the Internet 
transmission of a song that is downloaded to a computer creates a DPD, thereby 
requiring the payment of a compulsory license fee.22  The performance right for 
16See 17 U.S.C.  101 (sound recording is a work that results from the fixation of a 
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds  which can be embodied in material objects such as 
disks, tapes, or other phonorecords ).
17See http://www.riaa.com/issues/licensing/howto.asp.
18See 17 U.S.C.  106 (1), (3), (4).
19See 17 U.S.C.  115.  The Harry Fox Agency is the licensing agent for the copyright 
owners of most musical works (but not all), the copyrights to which are generally owned by 
music publishing companies, and most performers take mechanical licenses from the Harry Fox 
Agency rather than from the Copyright Office.  See R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet 
Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 237, 243 and n. 18 (2001). 
20See 17 U.S.C. 114 (a).
21Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, Public Law 104-39.
22See Reese, supra note 19, at 243-44.  There is some question whether the DPD right 
applies to the retention in RAM of portions of a song transmitted over the Internet (which is 
typical of streaming software which buffers the transmission to allow for continuous reception).  
See id. at 253-54.
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musical works, however, was unaffected by the 1995 statute.  Internet 
transmission of music to the public, even when received by someone who is 
listening at home, is a public performance for which permission is needed from 
the owner of the copyright in the musical work.23
The 1995 statute also created a new public performance right for sound 
recordings that are performed by a digital audio transmission. 24  The new 
performance right distinguishes between interactive and noninteractive transmis-
sion services.  Interactive services allow recipients to choose the music they want 
to hear; noninteractive services more closely resemble radio broadcasting, where 
the transmitter chooses the music that is transmitted.25  For certain noninteractive 
transmission services the statute provides for a compulsory license (with fees to 
be set by the Librarian of Congress).26  For interactive transmission services, 
however, permission of the owner of the copyright in the sound recording is 
required.
The sound recording reproduction and distribution rights are unchanged 
in the digital environment.  Permission of the owner of the copyright in the 
sound recording is still required for making and distributing copies of sound 
recordings that are transmitted digitally.
2.  File sharing
A rather remarkable convergence of complementary technologies and 
products has led to a situation where music listeners can share and copy 
substantial amounts of prerecorded music without paying royalties to any of the 
owners of the copyrights in the music or the sound recordings.  These technolo-
gies include the growth of the Internet itself, the development of faster modems 
and broadband connections to the Internet, the increased dispersion of personal 
computers with ever-increasing disk storage space, and the development and 
dispersion of CD-ROM drives and software that enable users to copy ( burn ) 
digital files to CDs.
23See id. at 245-46.  ASCAP and BMI contend that transmission for downloading also 
constitutes a public performance, even if the music is not audible during the transmission but 
only after the download.  See id. at 260.
2417 USC  106 (6).  The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA) 
was subsequently amended in 1998 by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
25See 17 USC  114 (j) (defining an interactive service  as one that enables a member 
of the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on 
request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, 
which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient ).
26The statute places further restrictions on what webcasters operating under the 
compulsory license can do, including restrictions on the selections of sound recordings being 
transmitted (the sound recording complement ) and on the type of programming information 
provided.  See 17 USC  114 (d)(2)(C).
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Particularly critical to the growth of free sharing of prerecorded music 
has been the development of file compression technology and of software 
enabling users to share these files.  File compression technology began in 1987 
when the Moving Picture Experts Group set a standard file format for the storage 
of audio recordings in a digital format called MPEG-1 layer 3, abbreviated as 
"MP3."27  Compressing songs into smaller files first enabled users to rip  songs 
from CDs and then allowed them to transmit those files over the Internet much 
more quickly, either by email or other file transfer protocol.28
Software enabling users to share files easily emerged in 1999 when 
Shawn Fanning developed the MusicShare  software which was offered on the 
Napster website.  This software enabled a user: (1) to list MP3 files stored on the 
user s computer hard drive that the user was willing to make available to other 
Napster users for copying; (2) to search for MP3 music files stored on other 
users' computers; and (3) to connect with a host user and download a copy of the 
contents of an MP3 file from one computer to the other over the Internet, "peer-
to-peer."29  Napster proved extremely popular, eventually attracting an estimated 
50 million users.
Copyright holders sued Napster in 1999 for contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement, successfully concluding the litigation in 2002 and 
shutting Napster down.30  Despite the Court of Appeals  complete rejection of a 
variety of copyright defenses asserted by Napster, and the uncontested nature of 
the infringement of the reproduction and distribution rights by users of Napster, 
and, indeed, the demise of Napster, file sharing services continued to operate and 
copyright holders continued to litigate against them.31
27See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale, and Kim Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to 
Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 458 n.10 
(2002).  MP3 is not the only file compression technology, but it is apparently the most popular.
28For example, a three-minute song of 32 megabyte size could be compressed into an 
MP3 file of about three megabytes.  Id.
29A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1012.
30See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
grant of preliminary injunction against Napster for contributory copyright infringement), 284 
F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding order to shut down service).  See also UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (defendant s service, allowing 
consumer-owners of CDs to access via the Internet copies of musical compositions recorded on 
those CDs, violated copyright laws where the actual stored and transmitted copies were made by 
defendant without authorization from copyright owners).
31Litigation is also proceeding against services that enable users to search for music 
files. See, e.g., Arista Records Inc. v. MP3Board Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (suit seeking to enjoin operation of Web site that permits users to search the Internet for 
MP3 files; denying motions for summary judgment).  The Napster brand  was subsequently 
resuscitated by a new venture that acquired the assets of pressplay.  See infra text accompanying 
note  58.
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The most popular file sharing software currently in use is KaZaA.  
KaZaA is based on FastTrack  software, which, unlike Napster, does not create 
a centralized database that a single firm monitors or controls.32  KaZaA s usage 
has now far surpassed Napster at its peak.33  Between its creation in April 2000 
until September 2003, for example, nearly 280 million copies had been 
downloaded, with approximately 2.5 million new downloads a week.34  Only 
somewhat less popular have been file sharing software programs based on 
Gnutella,  an open-source peer-to-peer platform that is even less centralized 
than the FastTrack network.35  By September 2003 nearly 125 million copies of 
the two main file sharing platforms using Gnutella (Morpheus and LimeWire) 
had been downloaded.36
Copyright litigation against these file sharing platforms has not been as 
successful as the litigation against Napster.  Sued by both the music and motion 
picture industries, file sharing software companies that offer software based on 
FastTrack and Gnutella have so far been successful in asserting that their 
decentralized design frees them from contributory or vicarious copyright 
infringement, the grounds relied on by the Ninth Circuit in finding that Napster 
violated the copyright laws.37
The inability to shut down the distributors of file sharing software has led 
the industry to focus directly on the consumers who actually engage in down-
loading and uploading copyrighted music.  Beginning at the end of 2002, the 
industry first sought names from Internet service providers of heavy music 
32For a description of the software. see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 259 F.Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Fagin et al., supra note 27, at 461.
33See Amy Harmon, Music Industry In Global Fight On Web Copies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
7, 2002, at A1, A6 (nearly 3 million users of KaZaA Media Desktop software at any given time, 
roughly double Napster s usage at its peak).
34See http://download.com.com/3101-2001-0-1.html?tag=pop, visited October 3, 2003 
(data compiled by CNET).  For earlier figures, see, e.g., Rob Fixmer, Showtime, Microsoft Style, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at G1 (reporting 2.7 million downloads for the week of September 
15, 2002).  By the summer of 2003 the number of downloads of KaZaA was five times the 
number of downloads of Napster.  See Kevin J. Delaney, KaZaA Founder Peddles Software to 
Speed File Sharing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2003, at B1.  Not all downloads are for new users; 
some of these downloads are duplicates and upgrades.  See Sandeep Junnarkar, Honest Thief
Confronts Music Industry, CNET News.com, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-985484.html.
35For a description of the Gnutella technology, see Grokster, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1041 
(users are connected through publicly available directories).
36See download.com, supra note 34.
37See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (defendants are not significantly different from 
companies that sell home video recorders or copy machines, both of which can be and are used to 
infringe copyrights ) (granting defendant software companies  motions for summary judgment 
relating to contributory and vicarious copyright liability) .
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sharers.38  The industry then filed suits against four students who ran file-sharing 
systems at three universities.39  Four months after the settlement of those suits, 
the industry filed copyright infringement suits against 261 individuals across the 
country who allegedly had more than 1,000 songs each on their personal 
computers.40  This litigation approach has proved to be controversial, and its 
deterrent effects are as yet unknown, but the industry has continued its effort to 
sue individual consumers who share substantial amounts of music.41
C.  Online Music Ventures
There are three somewhat different platforms for the distribution of 
music on the Internet: file-sharing services, webcasters, and interactive music 
services.  File-sharing services provide downloading and burning; noninteractive 
services ( webcasters  or Internet radio ) transmit a stream of music to 
consumers via the Internet, allowing consumers to choose from an array of music 
formats that is much larger than is available on over-the-air radio but which 
cannot be downloaded and replayed; interactive music services offer varying 
combinations of streams of music, downloading, and burning.
The recording industry s initial efforts to enter the online music business 
came in December 2001 in the form of two joint ventures, pressplay and 
38The industry s initial efforts to use the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act to obtain from Internet service providers the names of alleged infringers was rejected in 
Recording Indus. Ass n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,  2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25735 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  For reaction to the initial effort to obtain names of alleged infringers, 
see Dennis K. Berman & Anna Wilde Mathews, Is the Record Industry About to Bust Your 
Teenager?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2003, at D1.
39See Amy Harmon, Recording Industry Goes After Students Over Music Sharing, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 23, 2003, at A1.
40See Amy Harmon, Suit Settled for Students Downloading Music Online, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2003, at A22 (settlements ranged between $12,000 and $17,000 each; billions of 
dollars  originally asked for in relief; I don t believe I did anything wrong,  said one of the 
students).  Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, The High Cost of Sharing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, 
at B1 (70 suits filed in New York).
41For an argument that file sharing can be deterred by a risk of jail or a fine,  see Josh 
Bernoff, Can Young File Sharers Be Stopped? Yes!, available at 
http://www.forrester.com/ER/Research/Brief/0,1317,17183,00.html#fig_1 (61% to 74% of 
downloaders between 12 and 22 would stop downloading; approximately 30% would stop if it 
took twice as long to download); Ethan Smith, Music Industry Sounds Upbeat as Losses Slow, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2004, at B1 (reporting increased sales of music for 12 of 16 weeks after suits 
were filed; also reports that a series of hit albums were released during that period). See also 
John Schwartz, Music Industry Returns to Court, Altering Tactics of File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2004, at C1 (filing suit against 532 alleged large-scale individual infringers); Saul 
Hansell, Crackdown on Copyright Abuse May Send Music Traders Into Software Underground, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at C1 (discussing growth of software that masks users so that record 
industry cannot locate infringers).
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MusicNet, which were interactive subscription services that provided online 
music for a monthly fee.42  Pressplay was owned by UMG and Sony, the first and 
third largest sellers of prerecorded music in physical form, with approximately 
42 percent of that market.  MusicNet was approximately 60 percent-owned by 
Warner, BMG, and EMI, the second, fourth, and fifth largest sellers of 
prerecorded music in physical form, with approximately 41 percent of that 
market.43  RealNetworks, a developer of media playing software and an Internet 
content distributor, owned approximately 40 percent of the MusicNet venture.44
Each of the two joint ventures, as originally structured, held licenses for 
music only from its parent companies.45  This meant that consumers who wanted 
access to all the music controlled by the five largest distributors would need to 
subscribe to both services.  The two ventures also differed in the services they 
offered.  Both restricted the number of songs that could be streamed, but with 
different amounts.  Both services offered tethered  downloads (downloads of 
songs that expired once the subscription was ended or had other types of 
restrictions that prevented sharing), but of different numbers of songs.  Only 
pressplay offered burning  of songs to CDs (at an additional cost).46  Both 
services charged the same monthly fee ($9.95).
Consumer reaction to the original offerings was tepid,  with the two 
ventures reportedly having only 100,000 subscribers combined by mid-2002.47
In fact, AOL, a part-owner of MusicNet, did not even distribute MusicNet when 
it was originally launched, apparently because the service was so poorly 
received.48
42Vivendi, the parent of UMG, had two pre-existing separate online ventures.  One is 
EMusic, an MP3 subscription service acquired in 2001, which subsequently offered some UMG 
back catalogue for downloading.  See Jefferson Graham, Pay-for-play music services mimic 
Napster, The Journal News, Aug. 12, 2002, at 4D.  The other is MP3.com.
43In 2003 Sony acquired a 4% stake in MusicNet in the form of a convertible note. See 
Reuters, Sony backs rival MusicNet, CNET News.com, February 27, 2003 available at, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-990503.html ("[T]he investment may also signal a shift in the 
alliances that span the music technology industry"). 
44Zomba, which is part-owned by BMG, see www.hoovers.com, has a small ownership 
share in MusicNet.
45Except for EMI, the smallest of the five major record companies, which licensed its 
music to its non-affiliated  service, pressplay.
46Wall St. J., May 15, 2002.
47See John Borland, Pressplay to offer unlimited downloads, CNET News.com, July 31, 
2002, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-947507.html?tag=fd_lede; Graham, supra.
48See Julia Angwin & Nick Wingfield, AOL Revamps Music Service, But It s Costly, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at D1.
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By the end of 2002, however, the joint ventures had changed in important 
ways.  First, each of the music companies agreed to license their non-affiliated
joint ventures (these agreements were announced virtually simultaneously by the 
online ventures).  Second, both of the joint ventures decreased restrictions on the 
number of songs that could be streamed.  Third, MusicNet, as distributed 
through AOL, began offering burning of individual songs.49
By the end of 2002 there was also a substantial independently-owned 
online music service in operation, called Rhapsody, offered by Listen.com.  
Listen.com was founded in 1998, but its efforts to secure licenses from the five 
major distributors began to flower only after the labels themselves decided to 
move toward online distribution ventures. 50  By July 2002 Rhapsody announced 
that it had signed agreements with all five distributors (UMG, the largest 
distributor, being the last to agree).51  Although initial agreements with the major 
distributors did not permit Rhapsody to offer burning of songs to CDs, by the 
end of 2002, four of the five major companies had agreed to allow Rhapsody to 
offer burning (Sony had not).
Online music continued to evolve in 2003.  Four new independently-
owned ventures entered the market.  The most significant was Apple Computer, 
which began an online music service ( iTunes Music Store ) offering individual 
songs, as well as albums, for downloading,  rather than offering a monthly music 
subscription service (which has come to be known as the a la carte  approach, 
as opposed to the all you can eat  approach).52  It was the first service to offer 
downloading without a monthly subscription fee, although it was initially 
available only to users of Apple computers.  Its attractiveness was greatly 
enhanced by the marketing of a complementary digital music player (the iPod) 
for storing and playing digital music files.  After Apple s entry, and following 
Apple s business approach, BuyMusic.com began a service offering individual 
song and album downloads similar to Apple s but available on Windows PCs.53
 The third new entrant was MusicNow, owned by FullAudio and primarily 
distributed online through Clear Channel Communications (a Phoenix, Arizona, 
49See Julia Angwin and Nick Wingfield, AOL Ramps Music Service, But It s Costly, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at D1 ($17.95 to burn 10 songs, more than the cost of a CD in a 
store; quoting 15-year old consumer complaining that the number of songs permitted is not 
enough ).
50John Borland, Listen.com lands last Big Five label, CNET News.com, July 1, 2002, 
available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-940841.html?tag=bplst.
51Id.
52See Pui-Wing Tam & Anna Wilde Mathews, Apple Polishes Its Music Service, WALL 
ST. J., April 14, 2003,  at B1. 
53See Bob Tedeschi, Buy.com Chief Starts Site to Sell Music Downloads, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 23, 2003, at C4.
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radio broadcaster), which entered with a monthly subscription service oriented 
toward older adults. 54  It offered streaming, tethered downloads, and burning 
(although, at least at the beginning, Sony had not licensed any burning from its 
catalogue); by the end of the year it was also offering individual songs for 
downloading.55  The fourth new entrant to offer individual songs was Music-
Match, which had been distributing music player software and Internet radio.56
In addition to new entry, there were two major structural changes in the 
online music business in 2003.  RealNetworks, a minority owner of MusicNet 
(along with three of the five major record distributors), purchased Rhapsody, the 
major independent online service.57  At about the same time, Roxio, a digital 
media technology company which had previously acquired Napster's assets, 
agreed to buy substantially all of pressplay, the joint venture owned by UMG and 
Sony.58  Roxio s announced intention was to "build a reborn Napster service," 
using pressplay s infrastructure and licensing agreements and the Napster brand 
name, but without the peer to peer file sharing aspect.59  Although both Sony and 
UMG will each have a director on Roxio s board, and will be entitled to 
substantial income from the new Napster service, nevertheless, the sale appeared 
to constitute an important change in the two companies  approach to online 
music.60
Industry structure will likely continue to evolve in 2004.  A group of 
music retailers (Best Buy Co., Tower Records, Hastings Entertainment Inc, 
Trans World Entertainment Corp., Virgin Entertainment Group Inc., and 
Wherehouse Music Inc.) have announced the formation of Echo Inc., a 
consortium to develop an online music subscription service that will let each of 
54See Press Release, Feb. 17, 2003, http://www.fullaudio.com/pr.jsp?prDate=02172003.
55See http://www.fullaudio.com/partners.jsp.
56See Press Release, MusicMatch Introduces 99 Cent Downloads for the PC (Sept. 29, 
2003), available at 
http://www.musicmatch.com/info/company/press/releases/?year=2003&release=13.
57See David Bank, RealNetworks is Launching Its Own Online-Music Network, WALL 
ST. J., May 28 , 2003, at B7.  RealNetworks  chief executive, Rob Glaser, is chairman of 
MusicNet.  See Saul Hansell, E-Music Sites Settle on Prices.  It s a Start., N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 
2003, at C5.
58See Don Clark & Anna Wilde Mathews, Roxio Looks to Resurrect Napster, WALL 
ST. J., May 20, 2003, at B7; Nick Wingfield, Roxio Sells Shares to Revive Napster, WALL ST. J., 
June 30, 2003, at B5 (Roxio paid about $40 million to acquire pressplay).
59See John Borland, Roxio taps Fanning for Napster take two, CNET News.com, 
February 24, 2003 available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-985748.html).  At the time, 
Roxio only held a license from EMI, to offer downloads and burning.  
60See Clark & Mathews, supra note 58 (pressplay was a stepping stone  for finding 
new means to distribute music, according to CEO of Sony Music).
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the retailers distribute music on the Internet under their respective brand names.  
This venture, although announced in January of 2003, has yet to begin.61  Wal-
Mart has begun running a trial version of a download service, which it expects to 
introduce in spring 2004.62  Microsoft has announced its intention to sell  
downloads though its MSN Web site, using its bundled Windows Media 
Player.63  Sony, having sold its interest in pressplay, is planning a download 
service for spring 2004, along with the introduction of an inexpensive portable 
music player.64 Yahoo is considering entry as well.65
Although there is no publicly available information on the number of 
subscribers for each of the subscription services, it was reported that by early 
2003 approximately 300,000 people subscribed to all the services in total 
(creating revenues of approximately $25 million).66   Apple s per song service 
received substantial initial use, selling more than 17 million songs in its first six 
months.67  In terms of numbers of songs, the new Napster claims to have about 
500,000 songs, MusicNet about 400,000, Rhapsody and BuyMusic about 
300,000, and Apple and MusicMatch in excess of 200,000.68
Some convergence on pricing appears to have occurred.  For the monthly 
subscription services, there is a fee of about $10 for access to a pool of all the 
61See Nick Wingfield, Retailers Set Internet Music Venture, WALL ST. J.,  January 27, 
2003; Penelope Patsuris, Music Chains Raise the Volume on Downloads Forbes, January 27, 
2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/01/27/cx_pp_0127music.html); www.echo.com.  The current 
business plan includes "kiosks" inside record stores which will sell downloads or passes for 
downloads over the Internet.
62See John Schwartz & John Markoff, Power Players; Big Names Are Jumping Into the 
Crowded Online Music Field, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, p. C1.
63See Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, Microsoft To Sell Music Over the Web, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 17, 2003, at B1.
64See Power Players, supra note 62.
65See Jim Hu & John Borland, Yahoo composing music download plan, CNET 
News.com, Feb. 3, 2004, available at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5152860.html?tag=nefd_lede.
66Angwin & Wingfield, supra note 48 (Jupiter research estimate).  See also Power 
Players, supra note 62 (more than 300,000 total subscribers).  Rhapsody reportedly had 250,000 
subscribers in late 2003, see Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, With the Web Shaking Up Music, A 
Free-for-All in Online Songs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2003, at A1.
67See Free-for-All, supra note 66.  See also Amy Kover, It s Back. But Can the New 
Napster Survive?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, at p.4 (Apple sold 6.5 million songs in first three 
months). 
68See Amy Harmon, What Price Music? How Your Favorite Song Went on 99-Cent 
Special, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at Section 2, Page 1.  Rhapsody has more songs to listen to 
(385,000) than to purchase (275,000).
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songs on the service (allowing unlimited streaming and tethered downloads that 
expire when the subscription expires).  The charge for downloading is approxi-
mately 99 cents a song (Apple), although at one time Rhapsody ran a promo-
tional sale  at 49 cents each, BuyMusic is charging variable amounts, and Wal-
Mart is expected to charge 88 cents; albums generally are sold for about $10.69
Published estimates of the royalty paid to the record companies for downloads 
vary from 65 to 80 cents; costs for streaming paid to the record companies  are 
estimated to be between two-tenths of a cent and a penny for each song to which 
a subscriber listens (although there is a monthly guarantee for streaming of about 
$5.00).70  There are also additional fees that must be paid to those who hold the 
rights in the musical works.71  There are still numerous variations in the rights 
that consumers get, in terms of numbers of downloads, burning, and sharing with 
other computers; these rights can vary by song as well as by Internet music 
service.
This is not to say that these pricing plans are the only ones possible.  
There is still some uncertainty about whether most consumers in the future will 
move completely to the online world, with no desire to maintain hard copies
of music, in which case the current monthly fee might be considered to be too 
low.72  Music companies (or the online services) may engage in differential 
pricing depending on whether a song is a hot  release or part of the back 
catalogue.73  Nevertheless, as Rob Glaser, the chief executive of RealNetworks, 
chairman of MusicNet, and (subsequently) owner of the Rhapsody online 
service, said in March 2003, Everyone doesn t agree on everything, but 
everyone agrees on enough things that we can start putting products in the 
market. 74
69See, e.g., What Price Music?, supra note 68.  For an earlier review of charges, see 
David Pogue, The Internet As Jukebox, At a Price, NY TIMES, March 6, 2003, at G1; Walter 
Mossberg, Rhapsody Lets You Burn CDs online at 49 Cents a Song, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2003, 
at B1.
70See What Price Music?, supra note 68;  Settle on Prices, supra note 57.
71Although there is controversy over whether buffering  of music that is being 
streamed to a computer user is a reproduction of the musical work, thereby implicating the 
compulsory mechanical license, see n. 22, supra, the online ventures paid what may be a one-
time royalty to the Harry Fox Agency so as to get the ventures going.  See Amy Harmon, 
Copyright Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at C1 
($1 million up front payment by online music ventures to Harry Fox Agency, representing 
majority of music publishers); Interview with Nicholas Gordon, Esq., June 18, 2003.
72See Settle on Prices, supra note 57, at C5.
73Id.  Buy.com sells its songs at different prices; songs also have different rights of use, 
depending on the license from the record distributor.  See Bob Tedischi, Buy.com Chief Statrts 
Site to Sell Music Downloads, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at C4.
74See Settle on Prices, supra note 57, at C5.
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III.  Antitrust Analysis of Online Music Joint Ventures
A.  Market Definition
Markets are defined on the basis of substitutability by consumers and 
producers.  That is, markets are made up of a set of products that consumers 
believe to be reasonably good substitutes in use and that producers of other, even 
of slightly different, products cannot readily make.  Whether consumers or 
producers are likely to make substitutions can often be determined by the extent 
to which sellers of a set of products could raise price by a small amount and not 
loose so many customers, or attract so many sellers of close substitutes into 
producing the product, that the price rise would be unprofitable.
Prerecorded music can, of course, be listened to ( consumed ) in a 
variety of ways.  Although the music is all the same no matter how it is listened 
to, each channel of distribution provides the buyer with a somewhat different 
product and experience.  Music delivered in physical form has different 
characteristics than music that is broadcast over the air, although users certainly 
switch between the two.  Similarly, music that is delivered digitally over the 
Internet has different characteristics than music delivered in the physical medium 
of a CD.  And music delivered digitally over the Internet also varies by the 
different type of platform on which it is distributed, whether by free file-sharing
services, by webcasters, and by online interactive music services.
The closest substitutes for the product sold by online music services are 
free file-sharing services and physical CDs.  Although the streams of music that 
many of the online music services provide are similar to  the service provided by 
webcasting, copyright law keeps webcasting and interactive  services separate 
by product characteristics.  Consumers who want their online music on 
demand  can only select among various online music service offerings.
What about consumers who want to download or burn music?  If the 
sellers of online music raised their price by some small but significant and 
nontransitory  amount,  would these consumers switch to free file-sharing 
services?  Using the Merger Guidelines  five percent test,75 that would mean a 
nickel increase in the price of downloaded track, based on current market prices. 
 Although we can t say for certain what would happen, an educated guess would 
be that the hypothetical monopolist could make such an increase stick.  Both 
Napster and Rhapsody have experimented with prices that were more than a 
nickel below 99 cents per track (75 cents and 49 cents, respectively) and both 
have raised their prices back to 99 cents without losing so many sales as to make 
the increase unprofitable.76  Indeed, the fact that sellers of music online can price 
75See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Comm n, H ORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES  1.11 (for market definition in merger cases, a 5 percent price increase lasting for 
the foreseeable future).
76See What Price Music, supra note 68, at p. 32.  Rhapsody s sales more than tripled at 
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their product positively without losing all their customers to zero-priced file-
sharing services is indication in itself that there is separate consumer demand for 
a legal music service, a demand which increased dramatically during 2003, 
despite the continued existence of free file-sharing services.
Similarly, the hypothetical monopolist of online music could raise its 
price by a nickel a track without losing so much business to physical CDs as to 
make the price rise unprofitable.  For one, songs come in a bundle on a CD, so a 
CD will not be a substitute for a consumer who wants only a particular song.  
For consumers who want to buy an entire album, the general online price is 
about $10; an increase to $10.50 would not likely cause consumers to switch to 
physical CDs, which are generally priced at around $14.
At the same time, there is little doubt that the availability of free music 
has constrained the pricing of online music sellers.   Presumably, the greater the 
difference between the price of lawfully obtained music and the zero price of 
infringing music, the more willing consumers will be to substitute  free file 
sharing for priced online music (unless the industry can increase the cost of free 
music by increasing the enforcement risk).  Indeed, the industry s willingness to 
continue financing litigation against consumer-infringers shows that the 
recording industry views undeterred infringement as a competitive threat.  
Similarly, it is apparent that the retail price of physical CDs constrains the 
pricing power of sellers of online music and that, at least for now, sellers of 
online music have kept their prices below the average per track price of a 
physical CD.77
Paradoxically, perhaps, the argument for taking account of free file 
sharing is stronger in 2004 than it was in 2001 when the joint ventures were 
launched.  The argument is stronger because in 2001 in looked as though the 
industry might be successful in suppressing pirated music; by mid-2003 the 
ability to stop file sharing services through litigation was in substantial doubt, 
forcing the industry to proceed against direct infringers, an easier legal case but a 
harder enforcement target.  This is paradoxical, because the revenues from 
online music services were increasing substantially at the same time as the 
campaign to stop infringement was looking more problematic.  Free file-sharing 
may be a continuing competitive threat, but that has not prevented priced online 
music from flourishing as a product for which consumers are willing to pay.
The idea that market power can exist while still being subject to some 
constraint is not a surprising one, of course.  More than sixty years ago Learned 
Hand observed that Alcoa s pricing power was constrained by imports and 
substitute metals, but that within these constraints Alcoa still had substantial 
the 49 cent price; Napster s increase in sales at 79 cents was not proportionally greater than the 
decrease in price.  Id.
77See id. ( Ninety-nine cents is only slightly less than the cost of a song on a CD [given 
the usual price, around $14, and the usual number of tracks, around 12]. ).
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power over price.78  More recently, Microsoft s monopoly power in the 
operating systems market was somewhat constrained by competition from 
pirated software, but that was hardly reason to ignore the substantial power that 
it could and did exercise even subject to that constraint.79
B.  Competitive Effects of Joint Ventures
Joint ventures, like any other form of integration, offer efficiency benefits 
and pose competitive risks.  Joint ventures allow firms to pool capital and spread 
risk.  They may permit firms to achieve economies of scale or scope which 
reduce the cost of the product, or to bring products to market more quickly, or to 
combine different capabilities in a way that none of the individual firms would 
be able to do.80  Joint ventures involving intellectual property can provide 
additional benefits.  Intellectual property rights can be fragmented and 
conflicting.  Making effective use of these rights often requires some degree of 
joint effort (pooling) so that rights can be combined in a way that will allow a 
product to be produced and will clear conflicting claims.  Although the need for 
pools and collective action has long been acknowledged for patent rights, 
copyrights can be subject to the same problems, as, indeed, the splintering of 
rights in the music industry demonstrates.81
Joint ventures also have their anticompetitive risks.  The primary 
structural risk comes from the fact that joint ventures often combine the efforts 
of actual or potential competitors.  To the extent that the co-venturers might have 
produced the product individually, or one venturer might have produced the 
product while the other remained as a potential entrant, a joint venture ends 
competition between the co-venturers with regard to the output of the joint 
venture.82  Joint ventures, by functioning as joint sales agencies, might allow the 
venturers to end interseller price competition and agree on price.83  Joint 
78See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
79See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 25 (D.D.C. 1999) (  58), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 253 F.3d 34, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
80See Federal Trade Comm n and U.S. Department of Justice, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES 
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS  2.1.
81See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Amy Harmon, Copyright 
Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at C1 (describing 
multiplicity of rights that need to be cleared to provide online music service).
82See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 1710 (1964) (joint 
venture may have eliminated potential competition from one of the co-venturers remaining on the 
fringe of the market and threatening entry).
83See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (joint sales 
agency for marketing coal; subject to rule of reason); United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Online Music Joint Ventures: Taken For A Song
20
ventures might also pose risks to competition at different levels of the production 
or distribution process.  The co-venturers might withhold important inputs from 
competitors, or find other ways to raise their rivals  costs.  The co-venturers 
might also use the joint venture to exchange information in ways that affect price 
in the markets in which the co-venturers continue to compete.
C.  Forming the Joint Ventures
1.  BMI s guidance
The case that would seem most directly on point with regard to the 
formation of the online music joint ventures is the Supreme Court s decision in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.84  That case 
involved the licensing practices of ASCAP and BMI, the two major 
organizations in the United States that license performance rights to musical 
works.  ASCAP and BMI offered only a blanket license to all the music in their 
repertories; neither offered licenses for the performance of individual musical 
works. The Supreme Court held that ASCAP and BMI s joint licensing of 
performing rights was subject to a rule of reason analysis under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  Even though the blanket license substantially reduced interseller 
price competition with regard to licensing fees for individual music 
compositions, and could have been literally  viewed as price fixing, the Court 
required a fuller competitive analysis.  Central to its decision was the recognition 
of the integrative efficiency benefits of the joint operation.  The blanket license 
is a different product . . . of which the individual compositions are the raw 
material.   ASCAP and BMI made a market  in which individual copyright 
owners are inherently unable to fully effectively compete. 85
Thus BMI is both legally and factually relevant to an analysis of the 
online music joint ventures.  Legally, BMI underscores the importance of 
considering the efficiency benefits of competitor collaborations, stressing the 
need to allow for joint efforts among competitors where the joint effort is 
necessary to produce the product (in that case, no individual copyright holder 
could offer a blanket license).  Factually, BMI and ASCAP shed light on the 
need for copyright holders to pool the rights granted by the copyright laws in a 
way that economizes on what would otherwise be the high transactions costs of 
numerous low-value licenses between individual users and the copyright owners.
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (joint venture of four motion picture companies to 
provide new pay television service; subject to per se rule), aff d, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 21309 
(2d Cir. 1981).
84441 U.S. 1 (1979).
85Id. at 22-23.
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BMI is generally assumed to be a critical case for justifying collaborative 
behavior among competitors, with particular relevance to intellectual property 
rights.  What can easily be overlooked, however, is that BMI might have some 
very different lessons to teach, once greater attention is paid to institutional 
detail both for performing rights organizations and for online music joint 
ventures.  In fact, the development of online music may show that BMI itself is 
now wrong.
2.  Fragmented rights and  the need for pooling
ASCAP s formation dates back to a meeting in 1910 between Giacomo 
Puccini and his U.S. publisher, at which Puccini mentioned the role played by 
the Italian performing rights society in securing royalties for composers (the 
performance right only entered U.S. law in 1897).86  ASCAP was founded four 
years later.  Its commercial and legal history since that time demonstrates a 
continuing effort by the music industry to capture revenues from each newly-
emerging entertainment medium, from radio, to television, to motion pictures, to 
cable television, and now to the Internet.87  The justifications for collective 
action in pursuing these revenues, however, as set out fifty years ago by Sigmund 
Timberg, the Justice Department lawyer responsible for the consent decree 
against ASCAP, have remained constant.88  First is the pragmatic plea of 
commercial necessity  which arises from the need of music users to obtain the 
right to perform the music in a sure and speedy way. Second is the need of a user 
to be assured that it has permission to perform the copyrighted work and will not 
be subject to conflicting claims of infringement.  Third is the helplessness of its 
individual members to enforce their rights,  either because of the difficulty of 
detection or the high cost of litigation relative to the value of any single 
infringement.
Although each of these justifications involves transactions costs 
efficiencies, they do not necessarily justify the pooling and joint licensing of all 
performing rights in a single organization.  For one, there is no reason why the 
need for collective enforcement of performance rights also means that these 
rights must be collectively licensed.  Presumably, copyright holders could 
contract with a central agency to perform the policing function alone; this would 
capture the economies that flow from a single agent enforcing the rights of many 
86See Bernard Korman and I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and 
Performing Rights Societies,  J.COPYRIGHT SOC. OF THE U.S.A. 332, 350 (1986).
87See id. at 337-342.  The consent decree, originally entered in 1941, was amended in 
2001 to cover on- line music users  that publicly perform works via the Internet.  See United 
States v. ASCAP, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)  73,474 (  II (H) (second amended final 
judgment).
88See Sigmund Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandizing Modern Music: The 
ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 L.& CONTEMP. PROBS. 294, 297-98 (1954).
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holders more efficiently than each individual rights holder could.89  In fact, the 
recording industry itself shows that the efficiency of joint enforcement of sound 
recording rights need not be connected to the pooling of rights.  The industry s 
copyright infringement litigation against piracy has been led by a trade 
association vehicle, the Recording Industry Association of America, which does 
not engage in licensing.90
For another, the efficiency of collective licensing is related to the 
magnitude of the collective action faced by copyright holders and users.  
Performing rights ownership is highly fragmented.  At the time the ASCAP 
decree was amended in 1950 there were 365 music publishers and 2,040 
participating composers and authors.91  By contrast, approximately 80 percent of 
 the sound recording rights critical for an online music venture are controlled by 
five companies.
Nor is it clear why the efficiency of using a collective agency to license 
rights necessarily requires that agency to offer these rights only on a pooled 
basis.  Users may want to know where to go for copyright permissions, but that 
does not mean that they necessarily want to license all the rights that the 
collective has to offer.  Put otherwise, ASCAP s refusal to offer a per-song 
license makes the collective arrangement less efficient than it should be.  
Consumer welfare would be enhanced if the collective provided both the 
economies of offering the rights of numerous holders in one spot while still 
providing the licensee the ability to choose the rights that the licensee prefers.  
This was the choice that CBS wanted in BMI, of course.
In BMI the Court noted the ability of CBS to negotiate per song royalties 
directly with the copyright holder, but took this as proof of the efficiency of a 
blanket license rather than as an indication that efficiency could be enhanced if 
ASCAP were to offer both a blanket license and a per song license.92  The 
Court s unwillingness to recognize the welfare loss from ASCAP s refusal to 
provide individual licenses may perhaps have been the result of its implicit 
assumption that performing rights societies could not easily operate in any way 
other than by a blanket license. As Sigmund Timberg wrote in 1954: A blanket 
license covering ASCAP s total repertory is the price of avoiding industrial 
palsy in the entertainment world, says ASCAP, and thus far no important 
89See Stanley M. Besen, Sheila N. Kirby, & Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 383, 390 (1992)  ( A premise of our analysis is that 
significant economies result from collective administration. ).
90See http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp ( RIAA members create, manufacture 
and/or distribute approximately 90% of all legitimate sound recordings produced and sold in the 
United States )
91See Timberg, supra note 88, at 313.
92See 441 U.S. at 21 and n. 35.
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commercial user of ASCAP s music has contradicted this assertion for any 
length of time. 93
Whatever the strength of this assumption when BMI was decided, the 
efficiency which justified the refusal to offer individual licenses likely no longer 
holds.  In fact, the online music joint ventures help prove the point.  Online 
music ventures began by only offering a blanket license,  that is, legal access to 
an entire pool of music for a single fee (the all you can eat  model).  
Competition from free file sharing services showed, however, that consumers 
had a strong preference for consumption per-song; indeed, consumers were 
rejecting even the smaller technological bundle of the album  in favor of 
individual choices.  Competition then forced the online ventures to recognize 
this demand and offer sales of individual songs in addition to a monthly 
subscription to the entire repertory of songs that the service wanted to offer.  
Apple was the first to recognize this consumer demand; all the others followed 
when it became apparent how strong that demand was.
Returning to the Court s decision in BMI, by allowing copyright holders 
to agree collectively not to offer single-use licenses, when such an offering 
would have increased consumer welfare, the Court may actually have retarded 
the development of competition on the price of performing rights licenses.  In 
fact, whatever problems the performing rights organizations might have faced in 
the past in licensing individual compositions at competing prices, those 
technological problems have been reduced (if not eliminated) by the Internet 
itself and the development of distribution platforms which make such individual 
transactions economically feasible.  Other copyright collectives, making use of 
the Internet, already offer both per-use and blanket licenses, with per use 
royalties set by individual copyright holders.94  Thus BMI, it turns out, is not as 
strong a case for collective action as is generally thought.95  Far from offering 
93Timberg, supra note 88, at 297.
94The Copyright Clearance Center licenses text reproduction and distribution rights on a 
per-use basis, with royalties set by copyright holders; it also offers a blanket license.  See 
https://www.copyright.com/Help/HelpApsFAQ.asp#5 (copyright holders set their own royalty 
fees; clearance center charges a uniform processing fee).  Its willingness to offer these choices 
may be explained by the fact that, as in the music industry, holders of copyrights in written works 
face the difficult task in getting consumers to pay when piracy is cheap and easy.
95The Department of Justice may be ready to question the continued vitality of BMI with 
regard to the refusal to offer per-song licenses.  See Memorandum of the United States in Support 
of the Joint Motion to Enter Second Amended Final Judgment, United States v. ASCAP, at 9 
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 4, 2000) ( Technologies that allow rights holders and music users to easily and 
inexpensively monitor and track music usage are evolving rapidly.  Eventually, as it becomes less 
and less costly to identify and report performances of compositions and to obtain licenses for 
individual works or collections of works, these technologies may erode many of the justifications 
for collective licensing of performance rights by PROs.  The Department is continuing to 
investigate the extent to which the growth of these technologies warrants additional changes to 
the antitrust decrees against ASCAP and BMI, including the possibility that the PROs should be 
prohibited from collectively licensing certain types of users or performances. ), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f6300/6395.htm.
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strong justification for collective action by the record companies, BMI actually 
shrinks down to its underlying analytical approach: antitrust analysis must pay 
careful attention to the asserted efficiencies to see whether they are worth the 
cost of reduced competition.
3.  Demand side economies and one-stop shopping
A major justification for the music joint ventures, at least at their 
inception, was thought to be consumer desire for one-stop shopping.  An online 
music service could be that hoped-for celestial jukebox,  providing in one 
place all the music that exists in the world.  This was thought possible on the 
supply side, perhaps because Internet distribution (in contrast to distribution in 
physical space) appeared to provide infinite economies of scale.  This was 
thought desirable on the demand side because it would economize on consumer 
search costs.  Similar claims have been made for other Internet producer joint 
ventures, such as Orbitz.  As difficult as it may be to believe now, the claim for 
the efficiency of a single music site was a serious one in 2001.
Recall that one of the justifications for a performing rights organization is 
the need for users to gain rapid and indemnified access  to copyrighted works, 
with assurance that they would not be subject to conflicting claims of infringe-
ment.96  What better than a single source for licensing to achieve these aims?
Once again, however, the BMI case helps us see how weak this efficiency 
rationale actually is.  One of the curious anomalies in the market for licensing 
performing rights is that there are three performing rights organizations in the 
United States, not just one.97  ASCAP is the leading organization.  BMI, the 
second largest organization, was formed in 1940 by broadcasters as a response to 
ASCAP s effort in 1939 to license broadcast networks for the first time, as well 
as ASCAP s simultaneous effort to raise its license fees for broadcast stations.98
 In 1941 the broadcasters boycotted ASCAP music and began broadcasting 
mostly Latin music.  By late 1941 new licensing arrangements were agreed to 
between the broadcasters and ASCAP, a peace of sorts. 99  BMI continued in 
operation, however, perhaps in an effort by the broadcasters to maintain some 
leverage over ASCAP in negotiating royalties.100  Although BMI has historically 
96See BMI, 441 U.S. at 20.
97This is unlike the situation in other countries where there is only one performing rights 
organization. For a description of foreign performing rights societies, see Richard Schulenberg, 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY (1999).
98At the time, ASCAP was estimated to control between 85 and 90 percent of the music 
required by users such as broadcasters and dance halls.  See Buck v. Swanson, 33 F Supp 377, 
386 (D. Nebr 1939).
99Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 86, at 351 n. 87.
100See Besen, Kirby, & Salop, supra note 89, at 402 (discussing the entry of BMI).
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had lower revenues than ASCAP and fewer songs in its repertory, its 
compositions now comprise about the same percentage of music performed in 
most venues as does ASCAP s.101
One particularly interesting point about the existence of the three separate 
performing rights organizations is that their repertories are mutually exclusive.  
Songs can be licensed only to one association at a time, and composers and 
publishers cannot belong to ASCAP and BMI at the same time.  This means that 
users of music must take licenses from each of the organizations if they really 
want the unplanned, rapid and indemnified access to any and all of the repertory 
of compositions,  as the Court in BMI thought they would, unless they are 
willing (and able) to be more selective in the music that they perform.
The willingness of users to establish a competing performing rights 
organization, and the willingness of users to take licenses from more than one 
organization, indicates that the efficiencies from one-stop shopping may be small 
enough to be outweighed by the benefits that can flow from competition among 
different licensors of performing rights.  Put otherwise, although some degree of 
collective action may be efficient, this does not tell us what the optimal size of 
the collective might be.
For online music joint ventures, the benefits of one-stop shopping  are 
even weaker than they are for performing rights organizations.  It is surely 
cheaper for a user to click to another site on the Internet for the music that he or 
she seeks than it is for a licensee of performing rights to deal with three 
performing rights organizations.  Switching costs would be low even were the 
online music companies offering only a blanket license to an entire repertory 
(consumers might subscribe to two services, or switch at the end of a month s 
subscription).  But switching costs are particularly low where consumers seek 
and can get individual songs; searching for a specific song on several websites 
does not seem like a particularly arduous task.
The other side of the equation is that multiple ventures offer the 
possibility of competition.  This turns out to be true even in the performing rights 
organization context, where licensing fees negotiated with one organization can 
have an impact on the licensing fees of another.102  The short history of online 
music shows that it is much more the case for online music ventures.  Rather 
than a single platform, marketplace competition has produced a diversity of 
101See Memorandum of the United States in Support of the Joint Motion to Enter Second 
Amended Final Judgment, supra note 95, at 6-7 (ASCAP has over 8 million songs in its 
repertory; BMI has 4 to 5 million). SESAC, the third performing rights organization, was 
founded in 1930; its repertory, once limited to European and gospel music, has diversified to 
include today's most popular music, including dance hits, rock classics, the best of Latina music,
the hottest jazz, the hippest country and the coolest contemporary Christian music.   See http: 
//www.sesac.com/aboutsesac/aboutmain.asp.
102See ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563, 594 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(ASCAP rate court proceeding; using fees negotiated with BMI as benchmark for fees for 
ASCAP), discussed, Besen, Kirby, & Salop, supra note 89, at 405-407.
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efforts to market online music, providing different services and different 
packages for selling online music.  If we now had only a single platform, or the 
two industry joint ventures that we began with in 2001, consumers would never 
have received the benefits of this competition.
4.  Applying BMI
The formation of pressplay and MusicNet in 2001 meant that the co-
venturers in each of the ventures would not compete against each other by selling 
online music services.  On a basic level this competition might have taken the 
form of the individual music companies selling music online at different prices 
(whether price were set for the entire repertory or on a per song basis).  On a 
more important level, the competition might have taken the form of greater 
platform innovation, for example, offering music combined with different 
informational services, or offering music with different rights (e.g., full 
downloads).103  These possibilities were apparent even in 2001, when the 
ventures were formed.
The joint ventures, of course, were still free to compete against each 
other (although, like the performing rights societies, they did so initially with 
mutually exclusive repertories), so price competition was not extinguished.  
Further, the venturers were still free to license their music to other online music 
ventures, again much as the copyright holders in ASCAP and BMI, although it 
took a full year before all the music companies licensed any competitor outside 
the ventures.
BMI teaches us not to condemn collaborative arrangements on their face 
for literal  price (or product) fixing.  Even though each of the co-venturers 
could have produced the new product on its own (getting licenses from other 
companies for music they didn t control), and even though there are no demand 
side efficiencies from offering a single site (or two sites), there was also one 
obvious procompetitive effect from the joint ventures.  Output in the online 
music market was expanded by the entry of the two ventures.
How to balance the prediction of competitive harm from the restriction of 
competition among the co-venturers against the reality of new entry?  First there 
might be little to worry about if the two ventures themselves were not likely to 
have market power; in that case independent entry would not much matter. 
Assessing the ventures  market power would have been a somewhat difficult 
exercise in 2001, of course, given the unformed nature of the online music 
market when the ventures started, as well as the existence of competition from 
free file sharing services which provided at least some constraint on the 
ventures  price and product decisions.  Nevertheless, there is one structural 
factor that would have led to a prediction that the ventures would have market 
103See COMPETITOR COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES,  2.2 (potential harm to competition 
from increasing price or reducing quality of innovation below what likely would prevail in the 
absence of the agreement).
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power.  Each venture brought together companies that controlled approximately 
40 percent of the prerecorded music market; licenses to use this music are 
essential to an online music venture, in the sense that, for a lawful online music 
venture, there are no available substitutes.  Using market shares of these inputs 
as a proxy for market shares in online distribution, the market would have 
looked very concentrated indeed.104
The joint venturers were, however, contractually free to license rivals in 
the online music market, thereby creating competition on price and product 
quality and diminishing their market power.  But why would they do such a 
thing?  All their incentives would have been not to license, or, at best, to license 
strategically, so as to disadvantage competitors.  Firms in control of essential 
inputs do not usually want to help create competitors.  Indeed, given the 
concentrated nature of the prerecorded music industry, the transparency of 
information in the industry, the extensive contacts that industry participants have 
with one other, and the economic interest each participant had in not cannibaliz-
ing physical CD sales, overt agreements not to license competing online music 
ventures would hardly have been necessary.105  The prediction of tacit collusion 
regarding refusals to  license other ventures, plus the prediction of less than 
vigorous competition in a two-firm online music market, would have led to the 
conclusion that anticompetitive effects from these joint ventures would be likely.
And yet, the record companies did license their music to others.  Does 
that tell us that predictions of anticompetitive effects when the ventures were 
formed would have been misguided and that the contractually unrestrained 
ability to license meant that the creation of these joint ventures was not a 
competition problem?  The answer to both parts of this question should be no.  
The post-formation licensing behavior of the record companies has been the 
product of incentives, but of a particular sort.  The initial willingness to license 
Rhapsody came slowly and grudgingly, for example, likely motivated more by a 
concern for antitrust liability than by some desire to see competitors flourish, 
coming, as it did, at the same time that the Department of Justice was 
investigating the ventures and as a federal judge had expressed concern in open 
court about whether the ventures would pass antitrust muster.106  More 
104This would, at least, place the ventures outside either of the Guidelines  safety zones. 
See id. at  4.2 (twenty percent of the relevant market),  4.3 ( three independently controlled 
ventures  for research ventures that require specialized assets to engage in competitive research).
105The Department of Justice did consider in its investigation whether the major record 
labels used their joint ventures to suppress the growth of the Internet as a means of promoting 
and distributing music, in order to protect their present positions in the distribution of music on 
physical media, such as CDs,  but found that this fear did not materialize given the subsequent 
licensing of music by the venture participants.  See Department of Justice, Closing Statement, 
supra note 1, at 3-4.
106See In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1108-09 (N.D. Cal., 
2002) (joint ventures look bad, sound bad and smell bad ).  Similarly, the lack of a contractual 
restriction on licensing could very well have been the product of careful antitrust counseling, 
given the importance of non-exclusive licenses in BMI.  See also United States v.  Columbia 
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importantly, subsequent licensing may be explained by marketplace incentives 
arising from the industry s inability to end consumer record piracy.  To the 
industry s dismay, it still faces competition from file sharing.  In that 
environment, exclusion of competitors by controlling the essential inputs is not 
possible.  A better business strategy, then, is to follow the one that applies in 
physical space, that is, sell to everyone.107  It is no wonder that the owners of 
pressplay decided to sell pressplay to RealNetworks, a firm that can more 
effectively distribute digital music than pressplay could.  As the CEO of Sony 
Music was quoted as saying: We want to be part of this space [digital music 
distribution], but we don t feel that we, on a stand-alone basis, need to dominate 
one platform. 108
Prediction of anticompetitive effect is only one half of BMI.  There is still 
the fact that the joint ventures added new entrants to a nascent market, providing 
consumers with choices that had not been in the marketplace.  Would forbidding 
these joint ventures have meant less competition (lower output) than there would 
be if the ventures were allowed to enter and compete, albeit imperfectly?  
Potential competition analysis might answer this question, depending on what 
the plans were of any of these firms to enter independently, or to threaten 
independent entry.109  But even if none of the record companies would have 
independently entered, this does not mean that we would have been worse off 
without the joint ventures.  One important economic aspect of intellectual 
property is that, unlike physical property, its use by one party does not preclude 
simultaneous use by another.  Without the joint ventures there would have been 
no incentive to deny use of these intellectual property rights to all other entrants. 
 Even if the industry had succeeded in stopping file sharing services and 
widespread consumer infringement, the huge demand for digital music that these 
file sharing services uncovered would have led the industry to try to sell its 
music over the Internet one way or another.  Whether digital music would have 
been provided by licensing independent firms, or through vertical integration by 
individual record companies, this demand would not have long gone unsatisfied. 
Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting to the joint venture 9-month 
exclusive license of motion pictures, by motion picture co-venturers that controlled one-half of 
the essential product of the industry,  held to be per se unlawful group boycott), aff d, 1981 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21309 (2d Cir. 1981)
107See Wingfield and Smith, Free-for-All, supra note 66, at A1 ( For years, the major 
record labels balked at licensing their song catalogs to legitimate music sites, and most of them 
burdened the music with unwieldy technical safeguards that prevented consumers from recording 
songs onto CDs or transferring them to portable music players.  Now, the labels have gone 
headlong in the other direction. ).
108Clark & Matthews, supra note 58.
109For example, Sony subsequently announced its intention to enter independently.  See
Power Players, supra note 62, at C3.
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5.  Remedy
Suppose that the analysis of the formation of the joint ventures is correct
in its assessment that the predicted anticompetitive effects outweighed the 
procompetitive justifications, what remedy would have been appropriate?  The 
most obvious remedy, of course, would have been to enjoin the ventures from 
starting operations; or, subsequently, requiring the venturers to divest their 
ownership interests, leading, perhaps to the unwinding of the ventures.  The co-
venturers would then have been free to enter individually or to acquire sole 
control of one of the ventures.  The injunctive provisions could have been 
limited to allow joint entry if market conditions changed sufficiently so that joint 
entry would no longer be anticompetitive.
An alternative to unwinding the venture might have been some form of 
non-discriminatory licensing under which the record companies would have been 
required to license other online music ventures on terms no less favorable than 
the terms under which they licensed their own joint ventures.   Although this 
seems less drastic than divestiture, regulation of licensing might have ended up 
being more difficult to carry out and may have had unintended consequences on 
competition.110  Even in a compulsory licensing regime the record companies
incentives would have been weak to license other ventures on terms that would 
be more favorable than the terms under which they license their own ventures.  
This might have meant that a compulsory license requirement would have ended 
up homogenizing those offerings, a particularly unwanted outcome for a product 
in its early stages of development.  Further, compulsory licensing often leads to 
further review of the terms of particular contracts.  The incentives would be great 
for the joint venture participants to structure their agreements in a way that 
would disadvantage competitors (for example, by requiring the joint venture to 
pay high royalties), or might simply prove unattractive to competitors (for 
example, by placing restrictions on burning).  Review of such terms, however, 
would likely be a difficult process, as it has been for other compulsory licenses 
of copyrighted music.111
Here again, our experience with ASCAP and BMI should give us pause 
about the costs and benefits of such a decree.  The ASCAP consent decree, 
entered in the original litigation in 1941, has been a continuing source of 
controversy.  In recent years, the federal district court responsible for overseeing 
the decree has been required to decide on reasonable fees  under the terms of 
110Compare Jeffrey L. Harrison, Online Music: Antitrust and Copyright Perspectives, 
47 ANTITRUST BULL. 465, 488-89 (2002) (nondiscriminatory license requirement would be 
effective response,  although there are complications  from such a requirement) with Fagin et 
al., supra, at 522-27 (rejecting compulsory licensing as least plausible  solution).
111See Library of Congress, Copyright Office, Determination of Reasonable Rates and 
Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) (reviewing report of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel on rates 
and terms under the statutory compulsory license for webcasting; process began in 1998).
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the decree, and the court, the parties, and the Department of Justice have been 
required to continuously review the decree to keep it up to date.112
IV.  Conclusion
This article has argued that the appropriate analysis of the online music 
joint ventures, when announced in 2001, would have been to find that they were 
unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
This conclusion should have held even under the rule of reason inquiry mandated 
by BMI.
The joint ventures were made up of record companies that controlled 
approximately 80 percent of the non-substitutable inputs for a lawful online 
music service (that is, the licenses to the necessary sound recordings).  This 
made it predictable that the ventures would diminish platform and price 
competition in the online music market, whether in the form of competition 
between the ventures or, more importantly, in the form of the competition that 
would likely have emerged if the record companies did not start joint ventures 
but instead licensed their music freely to independently owned online music 
providers.  Although this predicted anticompetitive effect relies heavily on an ex 
ante view of the venturers  licensing incentives both with and without joint 
venture entry, particularly their incentives to license strategically, these 
anticompetitive effects still outweigh the very slight efficiency benefits from the 
joint ventures.  As a closer comparison with the performing rights organizations 
involved in BMI shows, collective action in the online music industry was not 
necessary to produce an online music service and offered only the barest of 
demand-side benefits in the form of modest one-stop  shopping.  The 
appropriate remedy would have been to enjoin the operation of pressplay and 
MusicNet, requiring either divestiture or unwinding of the ventures.
As we know, however, the online market has not turned out as predicted. 
 The record company owners of pressplay have divested their interests.  
Licensing appears to be fairly open (although it is unclear what restrictions are 
being placed on various licensees) and there is a proliferation of offerings.  
112The Department of Justice, for example, has complained about the extent to which the 
per-program and per-segment licenses required under the consent decree have a real possibility 
of constraining ASCAP s market power by allowing users to substitute some of their music 
licensing needs away from ASCAP.  See Memorandum of the United States in Support of the 
Joint Motion to Enter Second Amended Final Judgment, supra note 95, at 32 n.32.  Section IX of 
the decree requires ASCAP to license at a reasonable fee.   See United States v. ASCAP, 2001-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH)  73,474 (S.D.N.Y.) (second amended final judgment); this has sometimes 
required formal judicial findings. See, e.g., United States v. ASCAP, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7778 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (local cable system operators).  Korman and Koenigsberg, supra note 86 
at 356 n.123, write that as of 1985 there had been no formal trial proceedings over the decree s 
requirement that fees be reasonable,  although users had employed court proceedings as a 
context for negotiations . . . often with the aid of the court.
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However one might compute market shares at the moment, it would be doubtful 
that the market share held by MusicNet (the remaining joint venture) comes 
close to reflecting the shares its owners have in the wholesale market for 
prerecorded music.  Ironically, time and the owners of the ventures have done 
the work of antitrust remedies, producing divestiture of ownership of one joint 
venture and full access to the essential inputs controlled by the co-venturers.
To what do we owe our good fortune?  Surely it is to the inability of the 
music industry to control the widespread infringement of their copyrights.  
Whatever one thinks about the breadth of intellectual property rights today,113 or 
about the extent to which such infringement adversely affects the incentives of 
those in the industry to create and distribute new music, one must acknowledge 
that the competition posed by unstoppable infringement changed the record 
companies  incentives with regard to providing digital music on the Internet.  
The antitrust analysis of the joint ventures was based on the assumption that the 
venturers controlled the essential inputs.  When it became clear to them that they 
did not, they moved to a more efficient and more competitive strategy.  The 
result has been the development of online music joint ventures and the 
increasing variety in the platforms on which this music is being distributed.
It may be that the wait-and-see approach to enforcement that the Justice 
Department followed was institutionally appropriate.  This is an industry that is 
still in flux, based as it is on technologies that are still evolving, both in terms of 
the software platforms for delivering digital music and the hardware that now is 
being employed to store and transport digital music files.  Still, there is no reason 
to believe that we have reached an equilibrium where we can comfortably leave 
online music to the dictates of marketplace competition, either.  It is not likely 
that all the current sellers of online music will find the market profitable and it is 
still unclear what the optimal business model for delivering digital music over 
the Internet will be.114  What is clear is that there is an underlying competition 
problem if control of the essential inputs returns to the hands of a concentrated 
production industry, and one which may become even more concentrated in the 
future.
The incentives to control distribution over the Internet remain.  Care 
should be taken in the event that the markets shift once again and provide the 
industry the ability to control the distribution of those inputs.  We could yet be 
taken for a song.
113See generally EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY  (Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane Zimmerman, & 
Harry First, eds. 2001).
114See Wingfield & Smith, Free-for-All, supra note 66, at A1 (predicting that only three 
to six companies will be operating in the online music market by 2005).
